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Abstract The brutality of life on the street is explored in this paper with a young 
homeless couple and the ragged community of which they are a part. Destitution, 
prostitution, drugs and crime sculpt their lives and identify them as the symbolic 
edge of society, the boundary of civilisation, at the cultural margins, where 
subsistence is in a state of decomposition. Deserving of adversity? Theirs is a 
bordered being which seems to inspire a remarkable fortitude. They defy their 
abjected state with a Nietzschean determination for a kind of redemption in this life. 
Paradoxically, however damaged and broken their lives, however pitilessly 
rejection is dealt to them, however ravaged they are by what I would describe as the 
education of the street; this bleak place is often suffused with tenderness and 
compassion, intensely enacted and understood. How these moments variously 
unfold, frequently in searingly public places, is offered here and affords a glimpse 
of a life few could endure. 
  






Profound suffering ennobles; it separates. One of the most subtle 
forms of disguise is Epicureanism and a certain ostentatious bravery 
of taste which takes suffering frivolously and arms itself against 
everything sorrowful and profound. (Nietzsche, 1966, p. 209) 
 
Faulkner (2013) draws our attention to the strong and increasingly intense inflection 
of disgust in the chronology of Nietzsche’s philosophical works. Nietzsche’s 
disgust is intensely carnal and used evaluatively as a lens through which to view 
and gauge the seething cultural mass. It is not Miller’s (1997) idea of disgust: the 
insidious and negative assessor whose object is condemned as lowly and 
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inadequate. To distance oneself from the objectionable object, releases the disgusted 
from the threat imposed by proximity to the disgusting. Here, disgust has claimed 
superiority, but it is an uneasy state. Disgust should know that from this elevated 
position, the sullying pressure of the down-cast can still be felt. Miller 
acknowledges the pernicious nature of the contaminating lowly as too toxic even for 
the cleansing powers of the high. Faulkner (2013) however, prefers to interpret 
Nietzsche’s disgust as redemptive, recognising the different “potentialities” of 
“disgust” (p. 64). After all, disgust does not only order social rank and produce 
distance but also—and perhaps more powerfully—brings into relief the extent to 
which subjects and bodies are vulnerable to one another’s (polluting) influence in 
their very constitution. 
Faulkner continues that it is Nietzsche’s representations of disgust which allow 
for continuing exploration of its implications in coming to understand the 
uncertainties and intricacies of relationships between members of a community. 
Intimates, the endured, the loved, the offensive, the tolerated; is where disgust 
rages, or is benign. Is, or is not. 
It is by embracing disgust, not as some attempt to render it not disgusting, but 
as disgust, that Nietzsche is able to embark upon a critical re-evaluation of what we 
are and how we come to live. What questions does this raise in our consideration of 
certain others? Certain others whose very lives have become the antithesis of, on the 
whole, ourselves? The antithesis of at least most of us, who have some claim to 
being, registered as belonging, because and by virtue of this fact, that we have 
somewhere to live? What of the homeless?  
 
I’ll move to that bench so I don’t blow smoke on you 
No, you’re alright, stay there 
No, I’ll move, it’s not nice for you 
What’s she smoking Tony? 
Heroin, Frances 
Alright, Tony! You got any burn, mate? 
 
From March 2014 my colleague and I gradually became part of the lives of a group 
of chronically homeless, criminal drug addicts. Continuously homeless for three 
years or more, including living in hostels or other emergency, temporary 
accommodation, they have prison records which include offences on a scale 
covering public order misdemeanours, to attempted murder. Their daily lives are 
addicted to the procurement and voracious consumption of an eclectic variety of 
illegal drugs and what were until recently branded as legal highs.  
We would usually walk into the heart of the small city centre, and sit on one of 
the benches at the Cross. With St. Peter’s Church rising behind it, the Cross, an 
octagonal pillar with carved head and crucifix, is now an emaciated suggestion of 
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its former self. This sandstone splinter imperceptibly crumbling, the debt to pay for 
enduring existence, withstands cursory attention, silently professing its place as the 
centre of Chester, a town in the UK. An icon of its historic past in a significant 
public space, the Cross reflects a certain cultural and economic identity. The Tourist 
Guide boasts it as “A popular meeting place.” The noble ambition of English 
Heritage to preserve this particular meeting place is realised as it beckons all and 
sundry to the centre of the city. This open invitation to assemble is accepted by a 
number of extraordinary characters. The displaced find this place; the dispossessed 
gather. For a short time each day, the Cross punctuates the itinerant life of the 
ragged community that meet there. The appropriation of such a place by homeless 
people, a place which commemorates a proud heritage and normatively identified 
with people who belong, means it becomes a prime location of Nietzschean disgust. 
The homeless group congregate at the foot of this Cross; they are a threadbare 
community: the material signs of their symbolic incommensurability with ourselves. 
Membership, as Nietzsche predicted is through abjection; through our abjection of 
them. By this means they are identified as addicts, attempted murderers, smack-
heads, prostitutes, junkies, alcoholics, shoplifters; again, their histories describing a 
peculiar and distinct social and cultural experience which has shaped identities 
distinct from our own.  
All welcome, all residing close by at addresses, which, for the (un)fortunate 
few, may be safe seats; but for others, prospects are more bleak. Park benches, car 
parks and doorways beckon, for this is a public life, there is no private sanctuary, 
nowhere to retreat. Relationships entangle here; with friends and acquaintances, 
accomplices, rivals, a partnership, a transitory hierarchy of sorts which defines your 
place. Surprisingly, it is an unusually harmonious ensemble, yet their lament makes 
uncomfortable hearing. They are disregarded by the apparently unconscious neglect 
of passers-by, consumed with their own preoccupations, not admitting, or not 
wanting to admit, to these particular neighbours.  
Exuberant tourists, faces obscured, preferring an interrupted view; their 
vicarious excursion enjoyed by Nikon, first-hand. That’s done, tick it off, we’ve 
seen it: shops on rows, a cathedral, the wall, some sort of Cross, a river and 
racecourse. It’s a beautiful city, Chester. Memories secured with a swipe to prove 
fleeting presence. Fond reminiscences accompany images; innocent descriptions as 
incomplete as fixed, framed sepia for current consumption. In the eagerness to 
record, detail too unpalatable is unconsciously overlooked or intentionally omitted. 
Their averted, sanitised gaze contrives and imagines a city, easily, politely 
recountable to a distant, unaware audience back home. Optimistically, the contempt 
displayed by the hurrying dismissives is unconscious neglect; oblivion more easily 
absolved. Their faithful devotion to the unholy god of material avidity, builds 
memoirs of the most cursory kind. Except, this sinless, sinful act is not the privilege 
of just these pilgrims. Expectant shoppers anticipating a prolific haul, expertly 
The Disgusted Notice the Disgusting 
131 
 
avoid distraction as their dedicated stare seeks out the first acquisition. They 
succumb to their craving as certainly as any addict. Artisans from still-life 
boutiques take a moment from suggesting their trade. Compliant apprentices on a 
break, anxiously check their watch, as they bide their time. Shop assistants, or 
“professional stylist” preferred on the job description of the ambitious few, 
students, workers, work-less and others; the miscellaneously motivated, jostle in 
this potent milieu.  
 
Being a Homeless Couple  
John and Sophie were part of the homeless group who gathered at the Cross and 
were going to have a baby. They had not been a couple for long, a matter of months, 
both have young children from previous relationships but this was their first 
together. Neither of them sees their children who were adopted at birth and contact 
is infrequent, rigidly controlled, or forbidden. With their permission, of course, we 
hoped to spend as much time as possible with them and with the group they were 
part of who gathered at the Cross, to see what happened. So far, so predictable; the 
kind of project that often leads towards a “realist” understanding of social ontology. 
Especially as we were dealing at first with very conventional issues, such as those 
around ethical consent, and gender and power, and then the state and its 
expectations of the credible and sustainable family; all substantiated very 
mechanistically through the administrative and material procedures of social 
services and the charity of the third sector. 
As increasingly frequent acquaintances, we began to accumulate plausible 
understandings of a little of the lives of those who were part of the group. An 
account began to form as progressive instalments of the appallingly traumatic 
unfolded before us week after week. No fictional vignettes or empathetic 
imaginings here, but reality in all its brokenness lived in conspicuous detail. Any 
initial paraphrasing which described a constructivist understanding of communal 
ontology was precluded.  
We were allowed to inhabit the volatile space where John and Sophie 
communed with the group at the Cross. Proximity however, belied the distance 
between us. We were in each other’s company, often side by side, but we did not 
presume to occupy this place with them. It was a tentative familiarity, and any 
supposed intimacy accepted as misplaced. We were cautious in our attentiveness, 
even subdued in this negotiated space, where bracingly forthright exchanges about 
each other’s behaviours unfolded. Gossipy detail was shared; generously rowdy to 
include evading passers-by attempting to circumnavigate these “water-cooler” 
spectacles. We were part of these altercations as they skirmished around us, but our 
role was as audience not protagonist. Harrowing themes were argued in a 
preposterously comedic manner, with the tragedy of it all discarded in the most 
casual of ways.  
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The Homeless Anarchist 
 
There is no truth; there is no absolute state of affairs—no “thing in 
itself.” This itself is only Nihilism, and of the most extreme kind. It 
finds that the value of things consists precisely in the fact that these 
values are not real and never have been real but that they are only a 
symptom of strength on the part of the valuer…values and their 
modification are related to the growth of power and of the valuer. 
(Nietzsche, 1967a, pp. 13-14) 
 
On the streets, that which may be thought of as meaningful or purposeful in life is 
denounced in a convincing certainty that nothing is certain. The seemingly 
significant is rejected as insignificant. Contingent upon often fictitious 
understandings, the social, religious, political, professional, moral and ethical norms 
which traditionally define a conventional life, are dismissed with cynical contempt. 
Nietzsche’s extreme nihilism is conspicuous among those who are part of the 
homeless group we have come to know. A conformist society which finds these 
“members” inadmissible unknowingly emancipates a new and rebellious politics. 
An alternative Nietzschean manifesto which subverts accepted traditionalist 
principles and enfranchises the “disgusting” to conceive their own policy emerges; a 
kind of redemptive rebellion. Nihilist amorality empowers the powerless to live a 
different life. The seeming futility of a homeless life is a nihilism which refuses to 
succumb to predictable happenings, refuses to capitulate in the face of bleak 
realities; Nietzsche’s nihilism, which is uncompromising in its rejection of material 
and spiritual deliverance. Homelessness spawns anarchy and it is how “in God’s 
name” the homeless anarchist survives, is where nihilism is. For the austerity 
narrated in this paper, read nihilism.  
 
Educated in Abjection 
Nietzschean disgust conflicts around the ragged community who gather at the 
Cross; they have learned and learn their place. Each gloriously accomplished in the 
art of existence and each with virtuosic expertise in how to endure, how to barely 
survive, how to resist the miserable reality of their lived, daily certainty. They have 
secured this competence through grim personal experience of prolonged relentless 
intensity. Theirs are lives lived at the margins of society, at the boundary of 
civilisation, where subsistence lies at the edge of decomposition. The place they 
inhabit or have been located is both bleakly somatic and symbolically peripheral. 
They are the edge, the limit, the line in the sand; they are the outskirts. Theirs is a 
bordered being.  
Disinherited as human and recast as “The Homeless,” personal identity 
appears lost. A recognisable extremity of society forms; at the brink of our 
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consciousness, barely noticed, consigned to our cultural verges; homelessness is a 
disordered boundary existence, the frayed edge where entangled lives unravel, and 
threads are gnawed by aversion and administration to neaten this ragged remnant of 
society’s fabric. 
McClintock (1995) recognises that certain margins become “abject zones” (p. 
72) just as Tyler (2013) confirms, in her description of the dimensional aspect of 
abjection, that “it is spatializing, the abjecting subject attempts to generate a space, 
a distinction, a border, between herself and the polluting object, thing or person” (p. 
28). Homeless people are symbolically confined in wretched territories and 
subjugated by imperious governance, community repulsion and familial rejection.  
“Knowable through its daily interactions with citizens and others,” the state 
wields its power (Mountz, 2010, p. xxxi–xxxii). The state as “civil” society 
renounces its civic duty, that which befits a citizen of the state, in actively 
distancing the “uncivil”—a disconnected position. The state of homeless people, 
their uncivil condition that does not adhere to the norms of polite social intercourse, 
is policed with vigour. Homelessness reaps imprisonment. A bordered being is 
understood without ambiguity. It is known because it is lived, moment by moment; 
this is their place, the place of expulsion. The homeless people we have come to 
know, know about aversion and contempt and torment and exile: it is written on 
their emaciated pallid bodies. Lesions, abscesses, scabs, burn marks, bruises, needle 
marks, filth, grease, condemnation, repulsion...sculpt them; they are marked out, 
identified, and admitted, without reservation, as full members of an abjected 
community.  
Tony and I went to see Pete in hospital. After years of injecting heroin into his 
groin, the festering abscesses which he had left untreated, had burst and he had just 
had his leg amputated in an emergency. When he saw us come in to the ward, he 
started to cry and lifted his stump up to show us.  
 
“Dave, (Pete’s friend and a fellow homeless heroin addict), dove on 
my groin to stop the blood.” “I phoned my mum and told her I was 
having my leg off, but she said she was busy,” and he started to cry 
again.  
 
Put aside any outpourings of heartfelt compassion. As Bourgois and Schonberg 
(2009) heard frequently in their work with the Edgewater homeless drug addicts in 
San Francisco, “no one put a gun to my head and made me shoot heroin” (p. 19). 
There is no force involved in the habitual drug use amongst the members of this 
homeless group. They willingly surrender to addiction; capitulation is complete. 
Their lust and desire is for a master who enslaves without mercy. However, 
someone put a gun to the head of the men and women we came to know in Chester 
and lead them to a life of poverty, addiction, adversity and homelessness. Their 
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name? Sexual Abuse, Family Breakdown, Rent Arrears, Mental Illness, Fractured 
Relationships, Physical Abuse, Debt, Being In Care, Prison, Domestic Violence, 
Chaotic Upbringing and Crime. These “someones,” who may arouse a shred of 
tender concern (despite what they do to others), will not mitigate if the 
overwhelming public response is repulsion and the desire to abandon. The 
disconnection from the common populace intensifies a stratified perception of 
social ontology, where the imperceptible edge of communal awareness is the 
symbolic home for the homeless. 
Disgust affords the supremacy that sanctions a structuring and establishes 
hierarchical alignment. The disgusted notice the disgusting. They pay attention to 
that which is perceived as objectionable and, driven by their aversion, attempt to 
sever any possible connection. The rupture is absolute. Ahmed (2004) recognized 
the relation between disgust and power and how bodies become objects of disgust 
in her consideration of a dimensional element. She described disgust relations: 
“disgust as ‘that which is below’ functions to maintain the power relations between 
above and below through which ‘aboveness’ and ‘belowness’ become properties of 
particular bodies, objects and spaces” (p. 88). 
Vatan’s (2013) social dimension of disgust as “gatekeeper and boundary 
marker…associated with elitist feelings of contempt” (p. 40) correlates with 
Nietzsche’s (1966) “pathos of distance” which, he asserts, “develops from the 
incarnate differences of classes” and without which, he continues, that other “more 
mysterious pathos could not have developed” (p. 192). Although specifying an 
aristocratic regime, the politics are catholic and are not determined by any peculiar 
political system. Conway’s (1997) account of the pathos of distance as that which 
“signifies an enhanced sensibility for the order of rank that ‘naturally’ informs the 
rich plurality of human types,” recognizes a strictly categorizing social order, which 
assumes that the nature of being determines such a positioning, so must be 
contained within its boundaries (p. 40). Whether the pathos of distance which this 
social hierarchy awakens is catalytic for the development of Nietzsche’s “other 
more mysterious pathos,” is not specified, but what is clear, is that emerging from 
power relations preserved in a stratified society, Nietzsche’s origins of moralities, 
“master morality and slave morality” evolve (p. 194). 
Fossen’s (2008) revisiting of Nietzsche’s aristocratism details the relations of 
power between the social groups where different moralities are rooted and where the 
continuing power struggle which shapes human beings’ affective experiences occur. 
In Beyond Good and Evil (1966), Nietzsche describes how prolonged resistance to 
oppressive states existing within ranked constructs can lead to transformation. There 
can be conversion but not emancipation, so what emerges is Nietzsche’s daringly 
conspicuous heroic individual. Although their origin is not made clear in terms of 
social class, their emergence appears contingent upon such a social structure being 
the place where these audacious persons may subvert the status quo: 




The dangerous and uncanny point is reached where the grander, more 
manifold, more comprehensive life lives beyond the old morality; the 
“individual” stands there, reduced to his own law-giving, to his own 
arts and stratagems for self-preservation, self-enhancement, self-
redemption. (Nietzsche, 1966, p. 201) 
 
It is the continuing inner conflict ignited by the perceived discrepancies in worth 
attributed to different classes and the revolutionary repercussions these may have 
which precipitates Nietzsche’s (1966) enhancement of man, his self-overcoming 
which he imagines as “that longing for an ever-increasing widening of distance 
within the soul itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer, more remote, tense, more 
comprehensive states, in short, precisely the elevation of the type man” (p. 192).  
Homeless people are finished; their education is complete, but rather than 
resigning themselves to the bleak reality of street existence, implausible as it seems, 
transcendence is possible. Their thorough schooling in rejection and contempt, 
paradoxically, may inculcate qualities which Nietzsche anticipated. An elevated state 
beckons the brave. Although there is little hope of actual deliverance from their 
beggarly condition, within it, and as a consequence of it, a different kind of self can 
emerge. The state of homelessness may generate a master who is able to subjugate a 
slavish being and assume a new emboldened state within a state. The homeless now 
become Tyler’s (2013) “abjecting subject”; the abjected become the abjecting, in that 
they have learnt their position as society’s pollutant and with their bodies becoming 
the symbolic threshold of endurance, the resulting tension between a brutal lived 
reality and an evolving inner fortitude unfolds (p. 28). An unexpected repercussion 
of the educative conditions the homeless experience, this assiduous personal 
dedication to surmount the seemingly insurmountable, is redolent of Nietzsche’s self-
overcoming; a conviction which says, I know my state but it [the State] and they [the 
communal and familial state] do not know me: 
 
…it is the faith which is decisive here, which determines the order of 
rank here, to employ an old religious formula in a new and deeper 
sense: some fundamental certainty which a noble soul possesses in 
regard to itself, something which may not be sought or found and 
perhaps may not be lost either. The noble soul has reverence for itself. 
(Nietzsche, 1966, p. 215) 
 
The education of the street as experienced by the people in this group, who are 
homeless, is about a coming to know, a culturing about belonging, identity, 
behaviour, place, values and beliefs and is shaped by a particular exclusive 
community. It is of itself, it accepts itself, includes and admonishes but seldom 
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rejects and any rebuke is temporary and quickly forgiven. This education of the 
street exists. It is formed and cultivated by those who live it. It defines itself, 
moulds itself, maintains itself, manages itself, guards itself, polices itself; it looks to 
itself. Others, not of itself, from a distant and foreign place offer their own 
contributions, frequently experienced in condemnation or paralyzing administrative 
systems. 
The abstracted subsistence of homelessness is a marginalization which 
Lahman (2008) would undoubtedly characterize as “othered”; an “otherness” which 
identifies difference and distinguishes an “other” (p. 286). This distanced position 
was described earlier by Vidich and Lyman (2000) who questioned whether 
understanding could be possible if the values of the other were not the values of 
one’s own. Other is relational, yet affinity is uncertain. It is positional without 
connection as this may acquaint when distance is preferred. Other is comparative 
but segregated; it suggests inequality and difference, an asymmetric perspective 
viewed through the distorted lens of judgmental approximation.  
When your atrophying life resumes on the unforgiving concrete floor of an 
ice-cold, sodden, wind-swept cark park, or worse still, outside, the austerity of your 
existence demands a ruthless individual focus to survive. Hopefully to score, maybe 
to eat and drink, to appropriate funds to do so is your total focus. This collective 
aspiration coheres the homeless group but severs their affinity with the public 
around them for addiction continues to regiment their lives.  
 
Marked Out as Homeless 
Sophie was sitting away from John on one of the benches at the Cross. It was an 
unusually hot day. One of the things we came to realise was that the summer attire 
worn by the homeless appears to be exactly the same as winter apparel, but there’s 
less of it. You take off some items and roll up those that you have on. This made the 
appearance of these homeless, again, more radically different than those who appear 
to belong. The homeless sported various combinations of second hand tracksuits, 
shell suits, hoodies, sports socks and trainers, with some designer labels of difficult-
to-trace provenance. It had been pointed out by a member of staff from the Day 
Centre for Homeless People that items of clothing she was given to repair, often 
required a similar hole in them to be mended; the hole always being at the top of the 
garment, in the middle, just underneath the collar.  
The stigma of being homeless is the ubiquitous brand they wear. These entry-
level purchases imagine a belonging to another place. Chanel perfume, a Rolex, a 
Louis Vuitton bag, Armani jeans, Prada knitwear. They secure a tentative 
attachment to an almost-beyond-reach position, a better place, somewhere where 
the purchaser is prepared to pay the price, whatever the cost, for a transitory taste of 
prosperity. The debt for this belonging seems, for some, worth paying, as the 
symbolic status and respectability it affords, although understood within the 
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prescribed limits of social and fiscal constraints, is incalculable. Illogical as this 
undoubtedly is to the rationalist, in assuming a different character, even partially 
and temporarily, the fake prestige bestowed is a dualism which disturbs the 
equilibrium of identity.  
Yet for homeless people, access is denied, even at a most basic level. They 
wear designer labels by default and deception; the bleak reality of their lives, 
reasonably, should discard as inconsequential the symbolic eminence these items 
may inculcate or confer. However, the acceptable conventions of binary exchanges 
which normally, legitimately and conventionally secure the procurement of goods 
and services in a market economy are redundant here. In a loose interpretation of 
entrepreneurship, the homeless men and women we came to know, also see the 
worth of Versace and Yves Saint Laurent, as street commerce flourishes. High end 
goods, innocuous in themselves, are part of a prolific trafficking operation; the 
inexorable, degenerative nature of transactions is driven by addiction. The 
homeless, laid bare by addiction, bear the cost, on, and with, their bodies.  
We may be persuaded or convince ourselves to believe that we can clothe 
ourselves with a different life simply by putting on such items, yet the grasp is 
tentative and only disguises a certain reality of existence. Homelessness too drives 
alternative motivations, in that re-sale value has considerable credit when compared 
with more high street fare. The grimy reality of subsistence locates the wearers in a 
pragmatic place. Worn on grubby bodies, these status symbols of aspiration and 
wealth cannot afford to be worn and cannot afford not to be worn. The damaged and 
broken lives of John and Sophie, and those in the group, dislocate them from the 
ambitions of social existence described by egalitarianism, sovereignty and justice. 
Theirs is a meager autonomy, clawed painstakingly from the brutal reality of lives 
lived as they are in extremes. Paradoxically they seem to illicit with perilous ease, 
extravagances which the ‘virtuous’ may crave; yet they are forsaken without regret, 
as more valued addictions consume them.  
The perceived customary aspirations of a sustainable community may not at 
first seemingly correspond with those of the group and the drive to procurement 
need not require that we forsake all vestiges of personal dignity. Yet undoubtedly, 
the conventionality of mundane lives is excited (or enslaved?) by the seductive 
temptation of allurement. Consumerism and other best unnamed incentives, 
captivate, if not addict us to seek the more and the different. The conventions which 
ensnare us—homes, families, careers, expectations, requirements, desire—appear 
just as consuming as the pernicious demons who accompany the lives of the group 
who gather at the foot of the Cross.  
 
Sophie explained that the reason John was sitting away from her was 
that they had endured a traumatic evening. Around 10pm the night 
before, the road had been blocked off and police with dogs had raided 
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the house where they have been staying. As the raid began, Sophie 
being six months pregnant was crouched on the pavement outside 
vomiting into the gutter. John was sitting on the garden wall at the 
front, watching this. Almost immediately as the raid began, John was 
arrested and taken to the detention suite at the local police station. As 
Sophie was recounting this the next day, John was leaning across and 
adding details. He was very insistent that he had no idea what the 
police were looking for, but he explained to us, and the police, that it 
must be something very important on account of them blocking off the 
road and having dogs in the house.  
 
We could see John becoming increasingly agitated during our 
conversation with Sophie so to calm himself; he moved away from the 
benches, and then spotted a woman who was also homeless that he 
knew. As she approached the group, John began to recount a story he 
had recently heard about her. He said to the woman, “I’ve just got to 
ask you because everyone is saying this, that you gave X a blow job 
for a rock.” Everyone was laughing as well as the woman. She said 
“no” and everyone, including us, was laughing. The woman sat down 
on the bench next to us and alongside Karen. She was friends with 
Karen and explained that she had been away for a few days and that 
she was now “rattlin.” We could see she was from her shaking and her 
extreme agitation. Soon after, she left with Karen to find some food. 
Meanwhile, John had spotted a drug dealer who had arrived on a bike 
and looked to be about sixteen.  
 
The different tactics employed to effect necessary transactions amuse and repulse 
the group in these searing encounters. Wages derived from reckless indiscretions 
are commonplace as the insatiable desire to feed addiction effects its control. 
Intimate acts no longer reserved for a cherished other are currency. No extortion 
here, but a willing surrender of exquisite fulfilment, to fulfil another ecstasy. 
Although there is condemnation, it is more light-hearted rebuke, suggesting a tacit 
understanding of the shared desperation felt. Nothing is discounted or judged too 
harshly when dependence demands. 
Carroll and Trull (2015) in their research with homeless, drug-dependent, 
African-American women found (perhaps not surprisingly) that prostitution and 
robbery were the main means for acquiring drugs (p. 37). The women became the 
“prey” of the people who used drugs but also “predators” by engaging in such 
criminal behaviour. They reported however, that these behaviours enabled them to 
wrestle back some control of their situation and to “exact revenge for the 
psychological and physical injuries they experienced as children.” Seeing their 
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behaviour as vengeance enabled the women to feel a sense of power in their 
relationships with men. Using their bodies, possibly the only means at their disposal 
and maybe not always solely their possession, as a tool to assert their influence and 
place, should perhaps not be judged as reprehensible retribution but rather should be 
seen as an indication of the appalling nature of homelessness and drug addiction 
that invites, even necessitates, the exploitation of self simply to aid survival.  
 
Education of the Street: Salvation and Denial of Existence  
Nietzsche (1968) would undoubtedly cast the homeless people who gathered at the 
Cross amongst his weak, seeing their frailty as the reward for a ravaging devotion. 
They do not, however, suffer his desertion. Nietzsche dwelt uncomfortably with 
the suffering of the ordinary, and cautiously relocated to a less somatic position in 
his “life-affirming” offering. His abandonment is of hopelessness in a Dionysian 
call to disregard reality, to bear the unbearable and seek a joyful now. 
Schopenhauer’s (1819/1950) fatalistic regard for an intolerable human condition 
however, of individual culpability, is unmistakable in The World as Will and 
Representation, Vol I (p.63): 
 
If one wants to know what people are worth, morally considered, in 
full and in general, one should consider their fate, in full and in 
general. This is privation, wretchedness, misery, agony and death. 
Eternal justice reigns; if they were not so generally despicable, then 
their fate, considered in general, would not be so pathetic. 
 
Ultimately, his evangelism was of passive admission. He was an apostle of 
forbearance. Nietzsche (1967b) however releases the torment-shackled and urges 
transcendence in a conscious relinquishment of life, for living. A paradoxically 
absurd transposition, the abandoned, abandoning their plight, “you ought to learn 
the art of this-worldly comfort first; you ought to learn to laugh” (Attempt at Self-
Criticism, Nietzsche’s preface to the 1886 reissue of The Birth of Tragedy). 
Abstraction from the daily grime of life, to an immaculate and cleansed ideal, was 
not an eradication of the stains of existence, but a resolve to purify and be purified. 
For Schopenhauer, the monumental level of might required to affirm life was, for 
him, ultimately too great. It was, necessarily, an omnipotent strength, if the 
perpetuating anguished suffering of life was to be endured. 
Eagleton’s (1990) laconic observation captures Schopenhauer’s forlorn vision 
of life, “a grotesquely bad absurdist drama full of farcical repetition, a set of trivial 
variations on a shoddy script” (p. 156), from which he sought a liberating opiate: a 
spiritual release from the impossibility of reality. To accept a noumenal world 
consoles the earthly afflicted; it arrests the sobering verisimilitude of existence in 
the anticipation of divine solace.  
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Maslow (1973) reserves this transcendental rapture for his “self-actualising 
person” (p. 3). He suggests it may arouse and open up a new level of possibilities 
to investigation. He recommends that we lay ourselves bare to this. Intriguingly, 
Wright’s (1973) depiction of the self-actualised, “a fully-functioning person, being 
all that I have it in me to be; that self which I truly am,” seems curiously 
unfulfilled. A satisfaction which renounces enduring nirvana; the apogee of 
fulfillment(s) is forsaken by momentary saturation? The denouement of self-
actualisation, a culmination which seems to want for no more, is provoked by 
Maslow’s (1973) promise of sublime delirium. Responding to questions which 
prompt contemplation about moments which give greatest satisfaction, is the point 
of departure into his transhumanistic realm where his self-actualised may aspire. 
Tempting as Maslow’s proposition is, Nietzsche’s impassioned doctrine is for 
an existing, not eventual, euphoria. He beckons back from a beyond-reach utopia 
Maslow’s preeminent state, greedily the preserve of his self-actualised, and, 
descending that flawed hierarchy, reaches a flourishing nadir. Retribution for 
mediocrity; Nietzsche ordains the bankrupt, the pariahs, the defaulters, the 
perceived colourless insignificants (the homeless)…the ordinary masses, and 
offers conversion. Within a life already living, he champions a new and different 
conviction. 
A spiritual consummation, consoling the self-actualised, which Hartmann 
(1969) suggests includes goodness, beauty, perfection and simplicity beyond the 
self, is the antithesis of Nietzschean strength, a measure of which he suggests is 
“the extent we can admit to ourselves, without perishing, the merely apparent 
character, the necessity of lies. To this extent, nihilism is the denial of a truthful 
world, of being, might be a divine way of thinking” (Nietzsche, 1967a, p. 15). 
Nietzsche (1974) relegates the heroic altruism of Maslow’s transhumanistic realm, 
and champions a life of extemporised narcissism: “we want to be the poets of our 
lives, in the smallest and most commonplace matters” (p. 299). However savagely 
life etches itself into the soul; however tender its embrace, Nietzsche’s (1966) cry 
is affirmation (p. 209): 
 
Profound suffering ennobles; it separates. One of the most subtle 
forms of disguise is Epicureanism and a certain ostentatious bravery 
of taste which takes suffering frivolously and arms itself against 
everything sorrowful and profound. 
 
His challenge is amor fati, the love of fate, his principle for greatness “that one 
wants for nothing to be other than it is, not in the future, not in the past, not in all 
eternity” (Nietzsche, 1967c, p. 10) which utterly rejects salvation by faith. The 
beginning of salvation, Pope Francis reminds us, “is openness to something prior 
to ourselves, to a primordial gift that affirms life and sustains it in being. Only in 
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acknowledging this gift can we be transformed, experience salvation and bear 
good fruit” (Lumen Fidei, 2013, p. 21). As St. Paul confirms “By grace you have 
been saved through faith, and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God” 
(Ephesians 2:8).  
Nietzsche’s faith was in the dogma of eternal recurrence, an unreserved belief 
in life and existence itself. An unholy nihilistic conviction that subverts the 
stranglehold of spiritual obediences intent on suppressing the common populace, 
disguised as habitual norms of customary society. Schacht (1973) adjudges 
Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal recurrence as “a test of the nature of one’s attitude 
toward life” (p. 74) when “all that was and is” is wanted again “as it was and is to 
all eternity” Nietzsche (1966, p. 82). 
Nietzsche’s deterministic view is redemption in this life, which accepts the 
aggregate of past events, of preceding human actions and their inevitable 
consequences, then rejects the prospect of this ceaseless predictability. The 
repressed detail of recurrent narratives swept aside by Nietzsche’s audacious 
invitation to compose a new memoir; a re-writing of life. A nihilism which he 
described as that which “judges the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of the 
world it does not exist” (p. 585). The fortitude and resourcefulness to live another 
life (in this one), an unconventional life, an anarchic and heretical existence, which 
refuses to surrender to established metaphysical assurances, and seizes control, 
with resolute certainty, is a willfulness of unswerving courage.  
The post-theistic doctrine of eternal recurrence rejects the idea of a Creator-
God, the theological belief that the world had a beginning and that its origin was 
with God. Instead, calling, as Nietzsche does in The Gay Science, for a de-deified 
nature which connects his idea of the world as chaos with his dogma of eternal 
recurrence: 
 
The total character of the world, is for all eternity chaos, not in the 
sense of a lack of necessity but a lack of order…Let us beware of 
thinking that the world eternally creates new things…When will all 
these shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have 
completely de-deified nature? When may we begin to naturalize 
humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature. 
Nietzsche (1974, pp. 109-110) 
 
That eternal recurrence, “circulus vitiosus dues” (Nietzsche, 1966, p. 56)—divine 
vicious circle, entails an unholy incarnation, where redemption, deliverance, escape, 
call it what you will, is an eternal life of earthly, worldly, human infinity; with a 
self-creating, self-controlling personal genesis, which comprehensively rejects the 





Education of the Street: A Lesser Family  
The Day Centre where homeless people can gather is an old church; grey stoned, 
blackened with fumes, whose tiny windows, obscured with dirt, protect the viewer 
and the viewed. Worn carvings with indeterminate features, where once chiseled, 
imperious forms peered down, now cling, perishing, to the walls. A stone cross 
perches on the roof and claims the building. Its congregation, long since dead, may 
hope that the path through life to salvation they once walked with faithful devotion, 
has lead to eternal rest; a reward seemingly beyond the reach of its new 
parishioners.  
Inside, tables and chairs fill the centre of the room and an eclectic mix of 
grubby, frayed armchairs press against the walls. There is a television mounted 
high, and on this particular day, it was on, but turned down; a safe narcotic for the 
mesmerised spectators. If only this had been their sole corruption.  
John and Sophie were in there with others. The kitchen was open and two 
volunteers were behind the counter making hot drinks and buttering bread. It was 
quiet in there, not much talking. Sophie was sitting away from the others slumped in 
one of the armchairs. A fixed gaze fixed on nothing in particular as her thoughts 
consumed her.  
As Sophie had always been rather reserved in our previous encounters with the 
group, I tentatively went over to her. I sat there for a few moments and wondered 
whether my presence or any attempt to talk to her would be unwelcome. She was 
six months pregnant and looked weary and pallid. Her over-sized sweat shirt and 
jogging pants shabbily concealed her condition from those around her, who, apart 
from the kitchen staff, were all men and like her, all homeless, with various 
addictions, criminal pasts and mental health issues.  
 
“Are you okay Sophie?” She said she felt sick. “We could keep the 
baby if we found somewhere to live.” Sophie said that she didn’t want 
to go to the nearby town as it would be a “bad influence” on John, that 
it was a “rough” area and she “didn’t want him to get into trouble.” 
She seemed exhausted “I just want it finished now.” After a long 
pause, she said “I don’t want to leave this place, this is where my 
support is” then later added that she felt at home on the streets with 
homeless people. 
 
The Local Authority would not house John and Sophie because it did not recognise 
them as a couple and a potential family, even though Sophie was pregnant. If she 
had presented herself to the Local Authority as a single woman who was pregnant, 
they would have then housed her as a priority. The local charity for homeless people 
however, felt somehow compelled to act beyond the obligations of the Law to house 
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John and Sophie who had been abjected by the Law. The charity accepted them, not 
as a Family comprised of a Mother, Father and Child; but instead as a family, as a 
mother, father and child, accepted in this fallen state.  
The Local Authority, according to the inevitable logic of the Law they were 
obliged to follow, argued that, housed by the charity, John and Sophie were not 
homeless and it was inappropriate for the Local Authority to intervene. The 
problem was that the charity was unable to sustain, for legal reasons, what risked its 
own being in providing John and Sophie a home as a family, for an unknown length 
of time and certainly not with a child. Inevitably, the mother and father would be 
back on the street. The Local Authority’s response was that in these circumstances, 
John and Sophie will have been deemed by the Law to have made themselves 
intentionally homeless, and so the couple, family, mother, father would not be 
recognised as a family and, therefore, not housed. And the child? As the Law does 
not recognise their child it would be taken into the care of the State, by means of the 
Local Authority. Throughout, in order to maintain the child and be a family, John 
and Sophie were repeatedly advised to find somewhere independently to live. 
“This is how things should be” even as an imaginary assumption was more or 
less always absent from John’s and Sophie’s experience of family life when 
growing up. Instead, their certainty was more or less always traumatic. They drew 
from a well of absence: absent fathers, intermittent relationships with a mother and 
sister who were also on the streets, living rough, being “pissed on” as they slept. 
Yet, they had a seemingly unshakeable belief in their future as a family. To have a 
home and bear a child together seems such an ordinary ambition, yet this is a family 
beyond that easily understood as Family. What Family symbolises is obscured in 
lives born through trauma. The void left by life-long absence is never going to be 
filled by intermittent attendance at a local parenting class. The image of family life 
John and Sophie may have anticipated—home, baby, togetherness, jobs—is 
juxtaposed with the turbulence of their existence. They were an invalid family, so 
the Law would “say,” irredeemable, despite futile, temporary redemptive efforts to 
atone.  
Sophie’s understanding,  that “we could keep the baby if we found somewhere 
to live” resonates with Dotson’s (2011) findings in her research with women who 
were homeless, who understood all too well their situations, yet despite the hopeless 
reality of them, longed to better their prospects. Although most acknowledged the 
bleak truth of their state, to have a “normal, stable relationship” with their children, 
was still something that they desired and looked forward to, once they were “back 
on their feet” (Dotson, 2011, p. 254). 
Sophie’s hope that for her and John to keep the baby was dependent only upon 
them finding somewhere to live was heartbreakingly misplaced. In reality, her wish 
was futile; utterly delusional as her pregnancy had not interrupted the routine of a 
life lived with drugs. John too had not been able to curtail his drug use, although his 
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addiction to alcohol seemed more controlled. The hope she held on to, that it would 
be “different this time” (Sophie already had two other children who had been 
adopted) was idealistic. She and John were unable (or unwilling) to see the reality 
of their circumstance as they talked about impending parenthood. As Bourgois and 
Schonberg (2009, p. 208) found with the homeless heroin injectors in San 
Francisco: 
 
The pain in the intimate lives of the Edgewater homeless is 
exacerbated by the dissonance between their valuation of traditional 
kinship roles and the reality of their lives. The nuclear family ideal has 
never been an option for most of the Edgewater homeless. The family 
as an institution is a crucial network for resources and for the 
reproduction of cultural and ideological values, but it is also often a 
crucible for violence. 
 
We can speak of family about those who usually gathered as a group at the Cross, 
of which John and Sophie are part, “de prosapia mihi vires”—life and strength [is] 
to me from lineage, with prosapia acknowledging the extended family, seemingly 
appropriate in describing this group of erratics. “Street families comprised of 
homeless intimates” (Hudson, Hyamathi, Slagle et al, 2009, p. 357) replace blood 
ties which Takahashi, McElroy and Rowe (2002) found in their work with homeless 
women with children where relationships with family members had eroded as a 
result of the humiliation associated with being and becoming homeless. More 
immediate family members may have abdicated their responsibility, withdrawn 
their love, never have loved, never been loved, yet amongst this assembly, a 
peculiar warmth permeates. An unexpected fondness connects this miscellany, 
where affection, support and protection are apparent but often unconventionally 
expressed. Strident exchanges conceal an affability amongst this unlikely kin, yet 
what draws them together, keeps them together and endures, is a devotion 
transcending rapport, an unrequited obsession to a callous, predatory other. The 
insidious invincible presence of addiction accompanies them and demands 
submission without leniency. 
Wasn’t the Holy Family essentially displaced by the Law? Wouldn’t the 
mother have been disowned by a merciless decree and been condemned without 
miraculous intervention? Didn’t the constancy of the Father, secure this Holy 
Family? Does the act of not independently having a place to live and therefore 
Sophie and John being unable to secure their child within the current neoliberal 
regime, symbolically parallel, in a small way, the exile from belonging of the Holy 
Family? Weren’t the Holy Family taken in by an act of charity? The displaced 
found a place.  
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John and Sophie have learnt that they are a lesser couple and unrecognizable 
as a potential family. Even in a culture which now celebrates many unconventional 
family groupings, this notion of family cannot be accommodated. To shield a child 
from the pervasive suffering of the street where the sinister tentacles of drug 
addiction, crime, violence and abuse, creep and enfold, slowly bleeding life out of 
perilous life, undoubtedly and rightly must provoke immediate action from social 
services.  
The tender concern Sophie has for John, to protect him from the influences of 
a rough new town, struggle together with her desire for a home and the 
(im)possibility of a new start with their child, in this apparently unpredictable 
location. The affectionate anxiety she shows towards John however, disregards the 
reality which is John, and condemns John. Sophie’s seemingly altruistic outpouring 
deflects from her own uncertainties about committing herself to a new life with 
John but more difficult to accept, and therefore perhaps best neglected, is a 
suspicion that John, with regards to addiction, is irredeemable. It is a tacit 
understanding of someone who knows that a new start as a family is unattainable. If 
Sophie believes that actually they are deluding themselves and that this promise of 
salvation is not promised to them, it will demand all her strength. The dignity in 
profound suffering which Nietzsche (1967c) defends in his principle for greatness, 
“that one wants for nothing to be other than it is”; his love of fate, is here (p. 10). 
The education Sophie has received from the street, however bleak, is all she knows 
and its forces are merciless. At last an exhausted resignation but somewhere near a 
brutal truth emerges: “I just want it finished now, I don’t want to leave this town, 
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